Valéry, P. The idea of art.--Sartre, J.-P. The work of art.--Ingarden, R. Artistic and aesthetic values.--Merleau-Ponty, M. Eye and mind.--Moore, G. E. Wittgenstein's lectures in 1930-33.--Findlay, J. N. The perspicuous and the poignant.--Hungerland, I. C. Once again, aesthetic and non-aesthetic.--Wollheim, R. On drawing an object.--Elliott, R. K. Aesthetic theory and the experience of art.--Savile, A. The place of invention in the concept of art.--Bibliography (p. [178]-184).

Parmi les multiples énigmes de la généalogie de Jésus en Mt 1,1-17, la présence de quatre, voire de cinq femmes dans un texte où prédominent les hommes a suscité de nombreuses tentatives d’explication. Cet article part de l’observation que les quatre premières femmes sont en amont ou complices du roi David, tandis que la cinquième femme est la mère de celui qui est présenté comme Messie. Il constate par ailleurs que si l’on avait appliqué strictement les dispositions de la Torah (...) à leur égard, ni le grand roi, ni a fortiori la dynastie davidique n’auraient vu le jour. Le récit du dilemme de Joseph en 1,18-25 témoigne de son effort pour se frayer un chemin entre une certaine conformité avec la Loi et les exigences de la miséricorde en rapport avec le cas de sa femme enceinte. Ainsi, dès le début de l’évangile de Matthieu est posée la question de l’observance de la Torah face aux exigences des Prophètes et ultérieurement face à l’enseignement de Jésus. (shrink)

Unhappily, most writers who seek to relieve the present "dreary" situation in aesthetics offer us either verbal pettifogging or nineteenth century "systems." We are, therefore, indebted to Harold Osborne for publishing a brave, bold, wise, and defective book in the field. Despite their defects, these essays clarify some important issues in important ways. They deserve the serious attention of everyone seriously interested in art.

Clinical ethics consultation has become an important resource, but unlike other health care disciplines, it has no accreditation or accepted curriculum for training programs, no standards for practice, and no way to measure effectiveness. The Clinical Ethics Credentialing Project was launched to pilot‐test approaches to train, credential, privilege, and evaluate consultants.

What, if anything, do we epistemically owe to each other? Various “traditional” views of epistemology might hold either that we don’t epistemically owe anything to each other, because “what we owe to each other” is the realm of the moral, or that what we epistemically owe to each other is just to be epistemically responsible agents. Basu (2019) has recently argued, against such views, that morality makes extra-epistemic demands upon what we should believe about one another. So, what we owe (...) to each other is not just a matter of word and deed, but also of belief. And in fact, Basu argues, sometimes those moral demands require us to believe in ways that cut against orthodox epistemic norms. This paper has three aims. First, to offer two strategies for accommodating the kinds of cases Basu discusses while nonetheless holding that only epistemic normativity makes demands on belief. Second, to offer an alternative account of what we owe to each other that does not hold that morality demands that we sometimes believe against our evidence or in violation of epistemic norms. And third, to give a brief diagnosis of why it seems intuitive that morality makes extra-epistemic doxastic demands on us. Ultimately, I argue that what we epistemically owe to each other does not require us to violate orthodox, invariantist epistemic norms. Morality demands that we have a proper regard for others, not that we sometimes believe against our evidence. (shrink)

Here, in our approximation of polaron theory, we examine the importance of introducing theT product, which turn out to be a very convenient theoretical approach for the calculation of thermodynamical averages.We focus attention on the investigation of the so-called linear polaron Hamiltonian and present in detail the calculation of the correlation function, spectral function, and Green function for such a linear system.It is shown that the linear polaron Hamiltonian provides an exactly solvable model of our system, and the result obtained (...) with this approach holds true for an arbitrary coupling constant which describes the strength of interaction between the electron and the lattice vibrations. Then, with the help of a variational technique, we show the possibility of reducing the real polaron Hamiltonian to a socalled trial or approximate linear model Hamiltonian.We also consider the exact calculation of free energy with a special technique that reduces calculations with the help of the T product, which, in our opinion, works much better and is easier than other analogous considerations, for example, the path-integral or Feynman-integral method.(1,2)Here we furthermore recall our own work,(4) where it was shown that the results of Refs. 7 and 8 concerning the impedance calculation in the polaron model may be obtained directly without the use of the path-integral method.The study of the polaron system's thermodynamics is carried out by us in the framework of the functional method. A calculation of the free energy and the momentum distribution function is proposed.Note also that the polaron systems with strong coupling(9) proved to be useful in different quantum field models in connection with the construction of dynamical models of composite particles. A rigorous solution of the special strong-coupling polaron problem, describing the interaction of a nonrelativistic particle with a quantum field, was given by Bogolubov.(3) The works of Tavkhelidze, Fedyanin, Khrustalev, and others(10–13) are dedicated to the further development and generalization of the Bogolubov method.Notice, too, that the electron-photon interaction effects play an important part in many problems of modern solid state theory (see, e.g., Refs. 7 and 14–19).The present paper summarizes a set of lectures delivered as a special course in the physics department of Moscow State University. (shrink)

In virtue of what are we responsible for our beliefs? I argue that doxastic responsibility has a crucial social component: part of being responsible for our beliefs is being responsible to others. I suggest that this responsibility is a form of answerability with two distinct dimensions: an individual and an interpersonal dimension. While most views hold that the individual dimension is grounded in some form of control that we can exercise over our beliefs, I contend that we are answerable for (...) our beliefs as long as they reflect our evaluative commitments and dispositions, or are products of our reasoning, where this does not amount to a form of control. I next argue that answerability has a second, largely neglected dimension: the interpersonal dimension, which is grounded in what I call our relations of doxastic dependence. As social creatures, we depend on one another in our capacity as believers. We depend on one another as believers not only in epistemic ways, but also in practical ways, because our beliefs inform and motivate our actions, and allow us to participate in shared practical goals. Depending on one another in these ways is an unavoidable part of cooperating in the shared project of pursuing epistemic and practical success, and it makes us vulnerable to both epistemic and moral harm. It is because of this, I argue, that answerability has interpersonal normative force upon us: we are subject to legitimate expectations associated with participating in relations of doxastic dependence. (shrink)

A theodicy is the attempt to discern God's reasons for permitting evil, whereas the antitheodicy view rejects all such attempts outright. This chapter explores two sets of arguments that could be offered in support of antitheodicy. The first group of arguments concerns the morality of theodicy, and seeks to show that theodicy‐making conflicts with or undermines central aspects of morality – for example, the motivation to fight against gratuitous evil. The second group of arguments point out nonmoral (e.g., conceptual or (...) metaphysical) failings in theodicy, such as the unduly anthropomorphic notion of God usually at work in theodicies. (shrink)

The active transition to digital civilization coincided with the pandemic of the new coronavirus. It can be assumed that it was the pandemic that accelerated this process. In any case, people immediately faced to new phenomena, which can affect both physical and social health. Many phenomena, including both digitalization and pandemic, have not been explained and properly assessed yet. Absence of proper explanation and assessment creates a fertile field for insurance, doubts and mistakes. Therefore at the present time the evaluative (...) and explanatory role of bioethics is invaluable. But a paradoxical situation arises: the more bioethics help is needed, the less attention is paid to its development. The transfer of bioethics study for medical students into a distance format eliminates its communicative meanings and deprives future doctors of the opportunity to develop skills and competencies in medicine. Something must be done in order not to lose the achievements of the national training system in the field of bioethics. Certain suggestions are expressed in the article. (shrink)

The article traces the forty-year history of the establishment of the Bioethics training course at the Volgograd State Medical University, which turns 85 this year. It is told about those who played a major role in the development of bioethics as a training course, what difficulties and successes were along this path. The logic of the institutionalization of bioethics through the creation of ethical examination procedures is traced. Actual problems of bioethics, as well as ongoing bioethical activities are not covered (...) and are not called, since the materials of the anniversary issue of the journal are devoted to them. (shrink)

In “Surmounting Elusive Barriers: The Case for Bioethics Mediation,” Bergman argues that professionals trained in bioethics, reluctant to acquire the skills of mediation, would better be replaced by a cadre of mediators with some bioethics knowledge, to which I respond, “yes . . . but.”.

"Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand has been experiencing, for some time now, something of a 'golden age'. This is not to overlook, however, the rich philosophical past of Australasia, which - although heavily indebted to overseas trends - has managed to produce much distinctive and highly original work. These developments in the recent and distant past only serve to highlight the importance of documenting Australasia's great contribution to philosophy ... The Companion contains a wide range of encyclopaedia-like entries written (...) by leading philosophers, including biographical essays on selected philosophers, topics (existentialism, postmodernism etc) and controversies (e.g. the Orr case and the Sydney push), as well as shorter entries on associations, research centres, departments, journals, pedagogy, and international links. Important philosophical contributions made by those working outside of the academy are also included, as are the many inroads that have recently been made with the introduction of philosophy into the wider community (for example, in primary and secondary schools, and in various community-based forums such as the 'Socratic Dialogues' and 'Philosophy Cafes'). Despite, therefore, the concentration on institutionalised forms of philosophy in Australasia, due (if not overdue) recognition is also given to other aspects of Australasian philosophy."--publisher website. (shrink)